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Abstract
The analysis of security incidents and frauds has shown that several vulnerabilities of IT systems are due to
loopholes in the policies and procedures adopted by organizations as well as in their structure. Organizations
have thus to address security and dependability issues by analyzing their organizational setting. In this
paper, we present a methodology to support the deployment of Security & Dependability patterns according
to their position in the Enterprise Architecture and the underlying system infrastructures. The methodology
discriminates the pattern deployment process between recommendations and guidelines. Recommendations
concretize the deployment with reﬁned software and/or hardware related patterns, whereas guidelines specify
the organizational patterns in terms of the system-to-be, proposing human-resource and/or policy solutions.
To make the discussion more concrete, we illustrate the framework with a case study on an emergency
scenario within a remote healthcare system.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of security incidents and frauds has revealed that security is often com-
promised by exploiting organizational vulnerabilities [4,9,7]. Business organizations
and government agencies need to adopt appropriate security measures including
security policies and procedures intended to protect their IT systems as well as to
support their management and use.
The last years have seen a growing eﬀort to integrate security into the system
development process through authentication and access control mechanisms [10,2].
However, they focus on the IT system solely, and do not address security issues
within the organizational setting. Unfortunately, such an approach leaves a gap
between security measures and the requirements of the organization where the IT
system is embedded.
It is generally accepted in the Requirements Engineering community that system
development requires to analyze the system-to-be together with its intended opera-
tional environment [14]. This is even more important when the system has to meet
security and dependability requirements since security breaches often occur at the
organizational level rather than at the technical level [1]. At the organizational level,
the system is seen as a set of interacting agents (organizations/humans/software
agent); each of them is in charge of achieving a set of business goals. At this level of
abstraction, the focus is on what is needed to achieve organizational goals such as
task and resource allocation with the necessary authorizations, delegations or trust
relations. Functional and security solutions related to the processes used to achieve
these goals fall out of the scope of our study on the deployment of organizational
security patterns. These studies are addressed at business and communication lev-
els using diﬀerent types of formalism and technology (e.g., Workﬂow, Web Service,
Communication Channels, etc.).
Security & Dependability (S&D) patterns provide means to capture security ex-
pertise by suggesting solutions to recurring security and dependability issues [16].
Deploying an S&D pattern at the organizational level corresponds to modify an
initial organizational structure where S&D requirements are not fulﬁlled, leading to
a new organizational structure where these requirements are fulﬁlled. This makes it
possible to reduce vulnerabilities in the policies adopted by an organization and fa-
cilitate the selection of appropriate technical solutions during the subsequent phases
of the development process.
Current methodologies for applying security solutions at the organizational level
are limited to the conceptual level. In this direction, we ﬁnd the proposal by Kim
et al. [11], who introduces methods to reduce threats to the system by applying
security engineering. The proposed method for building security countermeasures
does not comprise details on its application into the systems to be enhanced. An
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interesting work on patterns was provided by Konrad et al. [12]. The aim of this
work is to implement eﬃcient security and privacy solutions as an integral part of a
business process and to deliver value to customers by measuring security risks. Yet,
these patterns are only available at the workﬂow (as opposed to organizational) level
and are not validated. In [16] the author takes advantages of the pattern approach
to propose a set of security solutions to be applied during the development process.
Similarly, the proposal by Yoder and Barcalow [17] covers diﬀerent security solu-
tions, such as role-based access control, but lacks technical information suﬃcient
to assist system developers in their implementation. However, this conceptual ap-
proach (i.e., starting from formal speciﬁcations for ending up with executable code)
is not suitable for securing an organization since it focuses more on code generation
leaving little room for the analysis of the context where solutions are applied.
In this paper, we present a ﬂexible and generic approach for the deployment of
S&D patterns at the organizational level. This ﬂexibility results from the adoption
of three complementary representations of S&D patterns. The ﬁrst patterns rep-
resentation is conceptual and is used to (proof-of-concept) validate S&D solutions.
The second representation concerns the infrastructure and describes the context in
which solutions are applied. Finally, patterns are represented through the guide-
lines driving their implementation. We, thus, use the term “S&D pattern” through
the paper to refer to any of above three representations. For pattern deﬁnition
and validation, we have taken advantages of the S&D pattern library deﬁned in the
SERENITY project 6 [3].
In this study, we bound the nature of systems to Software, Hardware, Human
Resource or Policy infrastructure and propose deployment guidelines determined
upon these types of infrastructure. These guidelines describe how patterns should
be implemented. The aim of the proposed approach is to enhance the best practices
for the deﬁnition of security policy and procedure as well as for the selection of the
infrastructure that support them. We demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and feasibility
of our approach using a case study in which S&D patterns are deployed in a remote
healthcare system prototype.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a healthcare system that
is used as a running example throughout the paper. Section 3 presents an overview
on the background underlying our methodology and illustrate them with examples
driven from our case study. Section 4 describes the methodology proposed in this
paper, illustrated with the remote healthcare system. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper with some directions for future work.
2 Case Study: remote healthcare system
The development of healthcare systems raises a number of S&D issues. The objec-
tive of this typology of systems is to monitor the patient health status and provide
the necessary assistance. To this end, healthcare systems should support the inter-
action and collaboration between doctors, pharmacists, patients, social workers and
6 EU-IST-IP 6th Framework Programme - SERENITY 27587 - http://www.serenity-project.org.
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emergency medical teams especially during emergency situations.
Patient health condition can be monitored through various wearable medical
sensors worn as a washable smart T-shirts [8]. All these sensors form the Body
Sensor Network (BSN). The measured data are collected and pre-processed by a
personal mobile hub such as a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). Similarly, the pa-
tient house is equipped with a sensor network and a local server, which centrally
processes the sensor data, for monitoring the activity of the patient and the envi-
ronmental setting. Hereafter, we refer to it as the smart home. A concrete example
of the smart home is the house built by the Domus Laboratory at the University
of Sherbrooke [15]. The information collected by the BSN and smart home are
sent to the Monitoring and Emergency Response Centre (MERC), the organization
responsible for the maintenance and storage of patient medical data, such as the
Electronic Health Record (EHR). The MERC processes such data to have a con-
stant snapshot of the patient health status and promptly initiate proper healthcare
procedures when a potential emergency alert is identiﬁed.
Among the possible application scenarios in the remote healthcare system, we
focus here on an emergency situation. In such a scenario, the patient health sta-
tus and activities are constantly monitored by the BSN and the smart home. All
alerts and critical situations detected are sent to the MERC where, after a detailed
analysis, the corresponding actions to help the patient are triggered. Hereafter the
scenario is described in detail.
A patient, Bob, is equipped with a BSN. Bob’s BSN detects a critical drop of
blood pressure. This information is transmitted by the BSN to the patient’s PDA. 7
The PDA immediately interprets this as an emergency situation and sends an alert
to the MERC as depicted in Figure 1. Alerts may also be voluntarily sent by Bob
to request doctor assistance, for instance, when he feels giddy. In the case of alert,
a rescue request together with Bob’s location information are sent by the MERC to
the emergency team who acknowledges to it. The emergency team is given access
to Bob’s EHR and last medical data collected by the BSN. When Bob is found,
the emergency team sends a notiﬁcation to the MERC together with comments
regarding medicines administrated to Bob before arrival.
The analysis of the emergency scenario have raised many security and depend-
ability issues concerning the safety of the patient and the protection of his data.
Table 1 lists the main requirements extracted from this scenario. In this work, we
mainly focus on S&D requirements to be satisﬁed at the organizational level.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 S&D patterns
Patterns have been proposed in the Software Engineering mainstream as a method
for object-based reuse [5]. S&D patterns are best practices capturing knowledge of
7 A PDA runs an eHealth software designed to support medical request and report sending and receiving
performed by the actor and to be compliant with the MERC.
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Fig. 1. Emergency case study
Req 1 If the patient loses consciousness, his e-health terminal shall receive enough data from the
patient smart T-shirt to immediately ﬁgure out the dangerous status and alert the MERC.
Req 2 If the emergency procedure has started, the MERC shall discover a medical team or a doctor
that commits to rescue or assist the patient.
Req 3 The MERC’s reception of the alert messages sent by the Smart Home and Bob’s eHealth
terminal shall be reliable.
Req 4 The system shall guarantee the non-repudiation on commitment of the medical team and
doctor
Req 5 Each communication between the MERC and the eHealth terminals of the selected doctor
and the medical team shall guarantee integrity and conﬁdentiality of the data exchanged.
Req 6 Each communication between the eHealth terminals of the selected doctor or the medical
team with the patient eHealth terminal shall guarantee integrity and conﬁdentiality of the
data exchanged.
Req 7 Insertions, modiﬁcations made by the selected doctor and medical team to the patient’s EHR
shall be reliable.
Table 1
Sample of S&D requirements for emergency scenario
S&D experts and making it available to system developers. This transfer of knowl-
edge is intended to improve the quality of the developed systems from S&D point
of view. Along the line suggested in our previous work [3], we deﬁne S&D patterns
as a quadruple 〈Context,Requirement, Solution,Consequences〉 where
Context deﬁnes the situation and conditions of pattern applicability. These con-
ditions are related to the minimal set of agents and their relationships necessary
to highlight the problem (threats) causing the non-fulﬁllment of the S&D require-
ments. They should be minimized in order to make the pattern more generic.
Requirement is the expression of the needs of a system to enhance its dependabil-
ity or security level. The description of the requested S&D properties may also
be expressed in terms of the acceptable frequency and severity of failure modes.
Solution speciﬁes how the requirements are achieved. It deﬁnes the needed mod-
iﬁcations (addition/elimination of agents/resources) to be applied to the orga-
nizational structure of the system in order to implement the appropriate S&D
mechanism that ensures the fulﬁllment of the requirements.
Consequences highlights the eﬀects of the pattern implementation on the system
behavior. It is important to make aware system developers about possible side
eﬀects caused by the pattern application. For example, introduction of vulnera-
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bilities, high costs, legal status (i.e., if compliant to some legislation or not), bad
impact on other S&D properties or information about performances.
Patterns are deﬁned in general terms as they should be applicable in diﬀerent ap-
plication domains. For instance, in the SERENITY project they have been applied
to an air traﬃc management system, a loan process system, and an e-Government
portal besides the remote healthcare system presented in this paper. The organiza-
tional S&D patterns in the SERENITY pattern library are described using SI* [13],
a modeling language for designing secure socio-technical systems. In particular, SI*
has been used to graphically represent the context and solution of patterns. These
patterns have been (proof-of-concept) validated through an automated reasoning
technique [6] underlying SI*. Such a technique is used to verify if patterns satisfy
the requirements for which they have been designed. A detailed description of SI*
and of the underlying formal analysis techniques, however, goes clearly beyond the
scope of this paper and we refer to [6,13] for them.
Example 3.1 [Redundancy Pattern] The ﬁrst and basic event in the emergency
scenario is the alert triggered by the smart home and PDA to the MERC. As
speciﬁed in Req 3 of Table 1, the reception of triggering alerts from both the smart
home and eHealth terminal shall be reliable. The system designer may select the
Redundancy pattern from the SERENITY library to increase the level of system
reliability. The proposed solution consists in duplicating unreliable services.
3.2 Framework for Enterprise Architecture
SERENITY patterns are generic enough to be applicable into several application
domain. When used in particular cases, they need to be customized and adapted
taking into account functional requirements and constraints speciﬁc to the applica-
tion domain. Aligned with the remote healthcare system presented in Section 2, our
objective is the deployment of organizational S&D patterns to support enterprises
in their daily business activities.
John Zachman has developed “the Zachman Framework for Enterprise Archi-
tecture” [18] that, similarly to the periodic table in chemistry, deﬁnes a roadmap
for IT and business architectures using the information collected about companies.
According to [18], “Enterprise” is an identiﬁed set of interacting business functions
capable to operate as an independent, standalone entity. Therefore, enterprises can
be recursively deﬁned. Architecture provides the underlying framework technology
while remaining implementation independent.
The Zachman framework organizes processes with respect to the perspective of
various players. These players, comprising the rows in the matrix of the framework,
include: (1) Planner, who has undertaken to do business in a particular industry.
This row deﬁnes the boundaries of the company as included, relevant, necessary or
excluded; (2) Owner, who represents the business people that run the organization;
(3) Designer, who creates the concepts quite independently from technologies to
solve the problems of the business; (4) Builder, who deﬁnes the company imple-
mentation based on the previous row’s constraints; and ﬁnally (5) Sub-Contractor,
P. Busnel et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 244 (2009) 27–3932
Fig. 2. Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architecture
who speciﬁes the implementations to speciﬁc technology products being used for
implementation. Each of these rows corresponds to a user visualization of the Data,
Function, Network, People, Time, and Motivation.
Example 3.2 [System Design] Following the lines of Example 3.1, we study Req 3
in Table 1 from the perspective of the Builder (row 4). The Builder of the system
deﬁnes the company implementation based on the concepts proposed to solve the
problems of the business. Req 3 speciﬁes the reliability on the reception of the alerts
triggered by a PDA and a smart home, by the MERC. This requirements falls in
the functional column of the matrix in Figure 2 as some technological choices has
to be taken. Therefore, the representation of the MERC’s reliability is through the
unique cell made by row 4 and column 2.
3.3 Organizational Infrastructure
An organizational infrastructure is the implementation platform used by an orga-
nization to perform its business activities. Here we mainly focus on four types of
infrastructures: Software, Hardware, Human Resource, and Policy infrastructures.
(i) Software infrastructure comprises the IT system within the organization. It
targets the data maintenance and data processing performed by organizations.
Examples of software infrastructures are Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP),
Supply Chain Management (SCM), and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA).
(ii) Hardware infrastructure covers the infrastructure usually made by sensors and
devices. It describes the new trend towards pervasive computing, where Am-
bient Intelligent (AmI) ecosystem provides facilities to better support organi-
zations in their activities.
(iii) Human Resource infrastructure comprises the humans within the organization
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and describes their roles and interactions with the other parts of the system.
Organizations are usually technique-mediated. Humans utilize technical media
such as emails, telephones, management IT systems, video cameras and other
software and hardware based tools, to run organization businesses. They are
often the users of the IT system, and the participation of system users usually
deﬁnes the success rate for these businesses.
(iv) Policy infrastructure comprises organizational policies as well as laws and reg-
ulations which the organization must comply with. It consists of authority
regulatory documents, contracts, certiﬁcates, etc.
These four types of infrastructure play a key role in the deployment process of the
organizational S&D patterns.
Example 3.3 [Monitoring and Emergency Response Centre] The MERC is a clear
example of hybrid infrastructure as it involves humans (e.g., administrative staﬀ,
doctors, etc.), hardware (e.g., PDAs), and software applications. For the sake of
simplicity, we mainly focus on the infrastructures necessary to satisfy Req 3 and Req
7. Assuming that Bob has given his consent to the MERC to collect and process his
medical data, the MERC (in the position of ‘Sub-Contractor’ at row 5 with respect
to the Zachman framework in Figure 2) handles the data insertion and modiﬁcation
in the emergency scenario processes through a software infrastructure. This software
infrastructure reﬂects the IT implementation used between Bob’s eHealth terminal
and the MERC’s workﬂow engine. Namely, the EHR’s implementation at the MERC
should be provided in SOA for web services. Hence, we realize that Req 7 speciﬁes
that operations made within this infrastructure shall be reliable. Req 3 tackles the
reliability of alerts sent to the MERC; while the smart home and eHealth terminal
will mainly be hardware and software infrastructures their receiver from MERC’s
side is judged according to the ‘Builder’ at row 4 to be human based. Such a
decision is aligned with legislation where big interest in putting responsibility or
having suﬃcient explanations when medical problems occur.
4 Methodology
In this section, we propose a methodology to deploy organizational S&D patterns
(Figure 3). This methodology is based on the library of S&D organizational patterns
deﬁned in the course of the SERENITY project (see [3]). The solution provided by
those patterns describes a new organizational structure that satisfy some require-
ments demanded by the system. Basically, S&D patterns present general solutions
in terms of new goals to be achieved by some actor and social relations among actors
within the system. Patterns are then selected from the S&D pattern library accord-
ing to the requirements to be satisﬁed by the system and its environmental context.
However, solutions do not make any reference to implementation infrastructures.
Not surprisingly, this abstraction level allows the application of additional (com-
bination of) solutions available at a lower operational level (e.g., web service and
workﬂow). Even with this additional constraint, we believe that the interpretation
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Fig. 3. Methodology for Deployment of S&D Organizational Patterns
of the pattern solution can be satisﬁed by the expert interpretations. For instance,
there may exist several possible implementations of the same pattern.
The right part of Figure 3 describes the methodology to deploy organizational
S&D patterns. We take into account three additional parameters in order to create
and/or retrieve 8 deployment procedures: Modeler Profile, which designates
the role of the pattern requester, taken from the set of roles presented by the
Zachman framework; Model Position in Enterprise Architecture, which
indicates the purpose of its usage, driven by the purposes presented in the Zachman
framework; and Model’s Implementation Infrastructure which points out
the infrastructure (out of the four infrastructures we identiﬁed in Section 3.3) where
the pattern will be used in the system-to-be. These parameters enrich the pattern
solution with information related to their deployment in the enterprise architecture.
Enterprise Architecture deﬁnes (and extends) the S&D patterns with an enter-
prise type of context semantics. The basic idea is to deduce the deployment process
of patterns by answering the questions ‘What is the role of the pattern requester in
the organization (i.e., what is his/her interest and duties in the organization)?’ and
‘In which aspect its S&D requirement is needed?’. The retrieved answers are input
〈 Modeler Profile, Model Position in the Enterprise Architecture〉 in
the Zachman framework to retrieve the context speciﬁcations. This makes it pos-
sible to infer the unique cell that provides semantic information about the context
in which the organizational S&D pattern is implemented. An example of how to
browse the Zachman framework has been presented in Example 3.2. Nevertheless,
this acquired context remains independent from the type of infrastructure.
In Section 3.3, we have discussed four types on implementation infrastructures.
8 Security experts follow this methodology to specify deployment procedures of their patterns, while re-
questers also do so for retrieving these deployment procedures.
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These infrastructures enrich organizational patterns by anticipating the actual im-
plementation infrastructure of the system-to-be. Not any type of infrastructure may
be suitable for all cells of the Zachman Framework. However, we leave to experts
the task of associating deployable solutions to limit the “Enterprise Architecture
−→ Implementation Infrastructure path” choices.
Using the gathered information, the consultancy box provides the requester with
a set of interpretations described through experts’ analysis. The consultancy box’s
conclusion is based on the information provided by requesters through the three
inputs. Speciﬁcally, the last input specifying the implementation infrastructure
of the system-to-be splits the consultancy proposals into either recommendations
(follow-up for the parameter corresponding to Software or Hardware implementation
infrastructures) or guidelines (follow-up for the parameter corresponding to Policy
and Human Resource implementation infrastructures).
4.1 Towards Deployment Recommendations for Organizational Patterns
All along the methodology, a more detailed deployment context has been identiﬁed.
The Software or Hardware implementation infrastructures, obviously, can be driven
the deﬁnition of S&D solutions (e.g., implementation code) that are more accurate
than those provided by the pattern library.
Example 4.1 The requester (i.e., sub-contractor) wants to ensure high reliability
of the healthcare system (Req 7). Nevertheless, the pattern solution described in
Example 3.1 requires the duplication of unreliable services (e.g., the web service
managing operations on the EHR). This, however, is not an appropriate interpre-
tation. Previously, the pattern requester selected his requirements constraining the
operational deployment of the solution. Currently, the requester selects the soft-
ware implementation infrastructure as the where the solution has to be applied.
The reliability requirement in addition to the new enhanced context are used to
fetch appropriate candidate S&D patterns speciﬁc for software implementation in-
frastructure. These new patterns are retrieved from the SERENITY library directly.
4.2 Towards Deployment Guidelines for Organizational Patterns
Guidelines are follow-up consultancy for the management of the expertise captured
in the organizational pattern for Policy and Human Resource implementation in-
frastructures. The deployment of S&D organizational patterns into the system
means to provide the system designer with the list of modiﬁcations needed to be
applied before starting the actual pattern implementation. Since our objective is
to assist system designers during system development, the pattern solution should
be described together with a group of guidelines for possible (including combined)
infrastructures in order to match the real needs of the organization and facilitate
the reuse of existing infrastructures.
Once an S&D pattern is selected, its deployment requires the system designer
to take the following actions:
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(i) instantiate the general terminology of the pattern to the one of the system.
During this step, analysts should understand the correspondence between the
pattern and the concrete instance of the system. Essentially, they have to
identify the correspondence between the general terms (i.e., actor-name, goal-
name, etc.) used in the pattern, and the actual instances within the system.
In case analysts disagree or cannot deﬁne these correspondences, the pattern
instantiation fails and the deployment process is halted.
(ii) conﬁrm preconditions that can not be veriﬁed automatically by the pattern.
Most of the S&D patterns constrain their deployment to other conditions.
Preconditions are conditions that need to be available before pattern deploy-
ment. The success of the deployment directly relates to them. Before selecting
the pattern, preconditions are checked by analysts. Preconditions at the level
of deployment are infrastructure-orientated. They generate conﬁrmation ques-
tions about organizational infrastructure conditions (e.g., Do you conﬁrm that
there is enough budget to higher one part time employee?).
(iii) modify the system corresponding to the guidelines provided by the pattern de-
ployment. The guidelines, presented in a document, describe the modiﬁcations
required for possible speciﬁc infrastructure(s) of the solution. Usually, this de-
scription is provided to the software designer in a structured natural language
format.
The guidelines provided by the pattern deployment process are deﬁned by the
security experts. These expert suggestions correspond to the guidelines they usually
propose during consultancy. This totally captures these experts consultancy during
pattern deployment.
Example 4.2 The Redundancy pattern has been proposed to guarantee the com-
pliance of the system with Req 3 in Table 1. Previously, the pattern requester has
deﬁned his requirements towards an operational deployment of the solution (see Ex-
ample 3.2). In particular, the ‘Builder’ has chosen the Human Resource infrastruc-
ture for the deployment of this solution. Following the guidelines described above,
the system designer has to instantiate the context of the Redundancy pattern using
the terminology used in the remote healthcare system domain. For instance, the
mapping assigns “Alert Calls” into unreliable services and the “MERC employee” to
the person in charge of receiving those requests. Once the correspondence between
the pattern context and the application domain is established, pattern preconditions
are veriﬁed. The ‘Builder’ needs to understand if the Human Resource infrastruc-
ture of the MERC can accommodate new receivers. The guidelines suggest to hire
a new employee and grants him the rights to receive, view and respond to the alert
requests. The pattern solution in the SERENITY library describes reliable services
as those services for which more than one actor are in charge of their achievement.
Thereby, the last guideline modiﬁes the alert workﬂow performed with the MERC
by ensuring that both employees – the initial employee and the new employee –
participate to the workﬂow.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a methodology for the deployment of S&D organizational
patterns. It relies on inputs from the pattern requester for selecting (sets of) de-
ployable solutions. The ﬁrst two inputs are fed to the Zachman Framework to
extend the pattern with context from the Enterprise Architecture. The third input
speciﬁes the implementation infrastructure of these systems. The consultancy box
is an analytical operation applied to the pattern solutions already enriched with
information about the system. It stores guidelines and recommendations of experts
about available patterns. Guidelines are used to describe solutions for Human Re-
source and Policy implementation infrastructure. Recommendations concretize the
deployment with reﬁned software and/or hardware related patterns.
The Zachman Framework implementation using Prote´ge´ is part of on-going work
at University of California Irvine. 9 Still one deﬁciency in our approach is in validat-
ing that requesters correctly followed the guidelines proposed by the methodology.
The usual software testing approaches (such as model-based testing) allow tech-
nical investigation of the properties available in the product with respect to their
intended operational procedure. Intuitively, we cannot apply such approaches to
validate the compliance between the S&D patterns and the pattern deployment.
As future work we aim to describe an approach that veriﬁes whether the system
designer succeeds or fails in following these deployment guidelines by monitoring
of system behavior or by monitoring both system and deployed pattern behavior
in case where the pattern has been implemented using software and/or hardware
infrastructures.
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